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THE DEMISE OF THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
Michael Botein*
Although most attention to problems in the telecom industries has
focussed on corporate malfeasance - e.g., Worldcom, Global Crossing, Adelphia
- the largest single failure may have been in the public sector. A decade ago the
United States government promised the country universal access to a high-speed
two-way broadband network, capable of delivering megabits of data and/or highquality video.
The White House's National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) described this "National Information
Infrastructure" (NII), or "electronic superhighway", quite explicitly as a highbandwidth network with far more capacity than data services such as the Intemet:
People could live almost anywhere they wanted, without foregoing
opportunities for useful and fulfilling employment by 'telecommuting' to their
offices through an electronic highway; the best schools, teachers, and courses
would be available to all students, without regard to geography, distance,
resources, or disability.'
But with the exception of a few corporate, governmental, or academic inhouse operations-"local area networks" (LANs) - nothing like the Nil exists
today. The Internet has not taken over the Nil's role. In terms of both speed and

* Professor of Law and Director, Media Center, New York Law School. B.A., Wesleyan
University, 1966; J.D., Cornell University, 1969; LL.M., Columbia University; 1971, J.S.D.,
Columbia University, 1979. The author wishes to thank the late Daisy Fischer for her support of
this and other papers. A prior version of this article appeared in Audio Visual Observatory,
Council of Europe, TRANSPARENCY (2002).
1 Agenda For Action 3, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, (Nat'l.
Telecom. And Info. Admin., D.C.). Sept 15, 1003, at 1.
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bandwidth, the Internet does not even begin to live up to NTIA's promises. 2 The
reason is that government essentially ducked out on its initial promises, leaving
implementation solely up to the private sector-which lacks the resources or
interest to act. By doing so, the government took itself out of the equation,
leaving responsibility and visibility with the private sector-which in the United
States need not and does not disclose much more than its existing financial
situation.3
The irony is that the information superhighway was designed partially to
enhance "electronic democracy," 4 but this goal has fallen into a black hole. This
paper thus attempts to analyze how far the private sector has gone, and plans to
go in implementing the NIl.
I. THE TECHNOLOGICAL DILEMMA
A previous article 5 explored the technological problems in implementing
the electronic superhighway. At present, only two media seem to have any
chance of delivering Nil-type bandwidth without building trillion-dollar new
telecommunications networks. These are the local exchange telephone
companies (LECs) - generally the large multi-state Regional Bell Operating
2 Michael

Botein, Information Superhighway: Is it FinanciallyFeasible? N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16,

2002, at 7.
3 Unlike

the European practice, "freedom of information" in the United States applies only as
against the federal government and only to a very limited extent. Obtaining information about
even short-term strategic planning by private companies, thus is quite difficult; they need not

make any planning documents-as opposed to financial reports-available to the public. Precisely
for this reason, some of the most crucial information in this paper is attributed to anonymous
sources.
4 For an excellent discussion of this concept in the context of the Internet, see Beth Noveck,

Democracy's Demise? The Impact of Internet Technology on the Perception of Democratic

Legitimacy, DEMOKRATIE: MODUS UND TELOS, 47 n.3 (2001).
5 Michael

Botein, Ten Years On the Information Superhighway,N.Y.L.J., July 16, 2002, at 5.

MEDIA LAW & POLICY
VOLUME XI

SPRING 2003

NUMBER 2

Companies (RBOCs) divested from American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
7
(ATT) in 19846 -- and the increasingly large cable television systems.
The good news is that LECs are switched, making it possible for any
telephone user to connect with any other user. The bad news is that they have
extremely limited bandwidth; after all, they were designed more than a century
ago for audio conversations, which require very little bandwidth - about onethousandth as much capacity as used by real-time video. But it may be possible
for LECs to deliver large amounts of data or video through use of a relatively
recent upgrade - a digital subscriber line (DSL). 8 DSL still is relatively
expensive, however, and a link can go only about three miles before running out
of power. Extensive new equipment as well as "home-run" lines to areas beyond
9
three miles from central offices are necessary and expensive.
Conversely, cable systems with state of the art hybrid fiberoptic-coaxial
(HFC) are capable of carrying up to 500 digital channels. But these services are
only one-way in nature, making it impossible for individual users to buy
particular information or programming. As with the LECs' bandwidth
limitations, a technological upgrade can largely cure this problem; a
technological fix can create the missing two-way capacity - namely, adding a
miniature switch in a "node" for every 300 to 500 cable subscribers. But this is
also expensive. 10

6 1996 Telecommunications Act §3(b). 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2001). LECs generally break down into
large incumbent (ILEC) and smaller competitive (CLEC) carriers.
7 F.C.C. Ann. Rep. (2002).
8 In

the Matter of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline

Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, 3026 (2002).
9 In the Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, 17 FCC Rcd. 1244, 1303 (2002).
10

Botein, supra note 2.
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The next question is whether these upgrades are economically feasible
and/or market-wise for either the telephone or the cable industry.

II. COSTS OF UPGRADES: LECs"
Probably the easiest and cheapest means for local telephone companies
to add broadband capability to their already switched networks is through DSL
deployment. The costs of upgrades vary with the density of the population to
be served, however, because of the need for additional "home-run" lines; the
terminal equipment would cost several hundred dollars per subscriber. (This
cost might fall dramatically with mass production, however, as is always the
case with new high-tech products.)
Most telecom engineers and economists price DSL implementation at
about $500 per customer for relatively dense areas (central business districts in
urban areas). 12 These also are the most desirable markets in terms of customer
commercial entities with
demographics, since by definition they include
3
requirements.'
transmission
data
intensive
On the other hand, service to suburban - let alone rural - areas would

increase the cost of the additional network lines tremendously - what most
observers view as about $1,000 per subscriber.14 In working out the potential
costs and thus capital generation requirements it probably is safer to use the

11There is no reliable published information in this area. Cost discussions are based on
confidential interviews of industry economists and technologists.
12Data

based on confidential interviews with industry experts.

13

Botein, supra note 2

14

Data based on confidential interviews with industry experts.
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higher and more conservative figure. 15 Results from this 6analysis then can be
1
compared with those under lower penetration scenarios.

III. COSTS OF UPGRADES: CABLE

7

State of the art cable systems might have slightly lower costs than LECs'18
Assuming that a cable system has implemented hybrid fiber optic coax
technology, (HFC), both users and central processing units would need just minor
hardware upgrades. Most advanced HFC-based systems already include the basic
technology for this in subscribers' converter units and operators' central offices
("head-ends"). 19
The only major increase in terms of hardware would be the addition of the
"nodes" and home-run cables. 20 Nodal switches cost about the equivalent of
personal computers. 2'
Moreover, the addition of the home-run lines would be considerably less
expensive with HFC than with DSL. As noted, DSL has a range of only about
three miles. 22 By contrast, with a few amplifiers, cable home-run lines can run

15Botein, supra note 2.
16See id.
17

Supra note 8.

8 1992 Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. 543 (2001).
19

Supra note 8.

20

id.

21

Data based on confidential interviews with industry experts.

22 Botein, supra note 2.
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more than ten miles back to the head-end.23 And a pure fiber line would have a
range of up to 30 miles without amplifiers.
For relatively basic switched purposes - e.g., high-speed modems, video
on demand - cable nodes most likely have a cost advantage over telephone DSL.
However, even the best nodal HFC systems today are not as reliable as
traditional telephone copper lines. Although figures are unclear, the cable
industry seems to accept that nodal HFC systems have a reliability of above 95
percent - compared to LECs' figures of close to 100 percent. 24 The difference is
probably not determinative for video or data uses, but it is vital for traditional
telephone applications - particularly emergency, "911" communications. Cable
operators privately admit that the possibility of not delivering an emergency call
raises insurmountable specters of legal liability.2 5 While cable systems can
possibly implement a video or data switched system at a lower cost than the
LECs could, at least in the foreseeable future, they could not offer reliable
telephone service - leaving this major revenue stream available only to the LECs.
This assumes that most cable systems will implement one-way highcapacity HFC systems shortly, but this upgrade is going very slowly, because
some major companies have started almost from scratch.26 Although HFC
implementation figures vary greatly from one company to another, the industry as
a whole will, almost certainly, not even change to one-way high-broadband
capability in the near future. Until most cable systems operate in this fashion,
however, the addition of nodal switching will be difficult or at the least, very
expensive. In part, because of the cable industry's particular Wall Street woes in
2001 and 2002, most companies' capital expenditures have declined over the last

23 Data
24

Data based on confidential interviews with industry experts.

25 Data
26

based on confidential interviews with industry experts.

based on confidential interviews with industry experts.

Bill McConnell, FTC Turns DTVSites on Cable, BROADCASTING &

10.

CABLE,

Aug. 12, 2002, at
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two years.27

Cable thus seems to have a significant advantage in terms of offering
interactive video/data service. Its inability to offer telephone service in the near
future as well as the slow build-out of HFC systems indicates that this advantage
is not likely to come into play soon.

IV. SOURCE OF FINANCING: EQUITY
Sale of equity is a traditional method of raising capital financing for new
ventures -particularly high-tech applications. It seems questionable whether
equity has any possible role in broadband today. Long-distance, LEC, cable, and
other telecom stocks already have taken a considerable fall. For example, as of
Fall, 2002, AT&T shares were selling at about fifteen percent of their Fall, 2000
28
price. Perhaps more alarmingly, some economists believe that, of the
approximate five trillion dollar sell-off in United States publicly traded shares
over the last two years, more than ninety-five percent came from media-related
sectors.
This suggests that the only possible financing for the superhighway would
be the debt market, for both the LECs and the cable companies. Although debt is
more easily available than equity for both industries, it is less than clear that
either industry's financial prospects support the type of debt potentially involved
with the electronic superhighway.

V. COSTS AND AVAILABILITY OF DEBT: LECs AND CABLE
27

Data based on confidential interviews with industry experts.

28

This is a global phenomenon. During the same time period, shares of France Telecom plunged

from more than $200.00 to about $7.00.
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COMPANIES
With these parameters in mind, it is possible to assess the viability of debt
financing for the information superhighway using the LECs, cable, or both. No
definite numbers are publicly available. For example, SBC Communications, Inc.
(SBC) reported that for 2001 it had budgeted $6 billion to create the
infrastructure for a DSL network reaching most of its 25-million wireline
customers. 29 Under either the optimistic $500, or the conservative $1,000 per
subscriber construction costs (estimated above), this does not seem realistic.
Moreover, informal reports in the Fall of 2002, indicated that SBC was planning
to cut this $6 billion figure in half. Indeed, the general trends among both mass
media and telecommunications companies have been to sell assets to reduce
debt.3 °
It may be more useful to look at a more contiguous area of the country the Northeast- and to contrast the likely debt position of the incumbent LEC Verizon - as well as that of a major cable company, Comcast. (Upon its
acquisition of roughly ten million cable subscribers from ATT towards early
2003, Comcast became the largest United States cable operator). 31 This analysis
does not include wireless communications, which lacks enough bandwidth for
high-speed data or high-quality video.
But the cable industry has also had problems with capital investment.
Cablevision Corporation, one of the four largest U.S. operators,
recently
32
indicated that it was virtually halting new capital construction.
A. LECs
29

Even under the optimistic $500/subscriber assumption, servicing all of SBC's customers would

seem to imply costs of more than $10 billion. SBC Communications, Inc., Securities & Exchange
Commission Form 10-K, at 4, January, 31, 2002.
30 Wall Street JournalAbstracts,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at Cl.
31 Comcast Corporation, Securities & Exchange Commission Form 10-K, at 25, 31 January 2002.
32 John M. Higgins, Cablevision: But What Vision?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, at 12.
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To provide the Nil's universal service would require reaching about
30,000,000 subscribers in the Northeast, (this number is approximately the same
as the number of wireline users currently served by Verizon).33 Thus, the
optimistic technological model would require a company to raise $15 billion, the
conservative model $30 billion.
Debt is always available for going concerns on some terms. The question
is: which ones? Verizon is now carrying about $46 billion in long-term debt with
revenues of $67 billion. 34 Universal-broadband implementation would make its
long-term debt $76 billion -- $10 billion greater than its operating revenues. This
number naturally will decline over the years; most long-term debt in the
telephone industry runs for 8-10 years, so the present debt will decrease in the
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, in the short term Verizon would be carrying a
large amount of debt.
All of these factors would naturally affect an LEC's bond ratings, and
hence affect the level of new debt interest payments. Although most LECs have
traditionally enjoyed very high ratings, this has begun to change in today's
financial and stock market environment. Moody's recently downgraded Bell
South's rating, and has indicated that it may do the same with SBC and
35
Verizon.
Moreover, universal broadband service is not exactly a lead-pipe cinch
to yield strong returns. Lenders of all types burnt their fingers rather badly
during the "dotcom" frenzy at the turn of the millennium, and thus, are less
than anxious to invest in new markets without proven returns.
33 Verizon Company Profile, Wireless at http://investor.verizon.com/profile/wireless.html.
34 Bell Atlantic Corporation, Verizon Communications, Inc. 1O-Kfiled on March 20, 2002,

Hoovers Online, March 8, 2003 at http://hoovers. 10kwizard.com/filing.
35 A Moody's executive recently included telecommunications in a group of "very weak
industries" in terns of debt availability. Alan Beattie, CompaniesShun Creditto CutDebt& Prop
Balance Sheet, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at 3.
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Debt financing for LECs, such as Verizon, is likely to require a
significantly higher interest rate than the past eight to nine percent range.
Although predictions are impossible, several economists have privately projected
rates in the twelve to thirteen percent area. This is higher than what cable
companies have paid in the past. 36 These numbers are not particularly attractive
to lenders or LEC investors, as they seem to be headed down the slippery slope
towards junk status.
Assuming even relatively modest interest increases for LECs, the cost of
the transaction would naturally increase dramatically. As a rough estimate, the
per-subscriber bond service cost would be about $500 per year. This figure
includes interest, principal retirement and operating costs. In order to show even
a modest profit, this would require subscriber prices of about $50 to $60 per
month - at or above what a limited number of people are willing to pay for highspeed cable modem service.
Most consumers simply are not willing to pay this kind of money for
broadband service. At the end of 2001, BellSouth reported just over seven
37
percent DSL penetration Verizon only about four percent.
All new technologies go through a cycle of slow initial growth, which
usually is followed by explosive expansion in their later decades of operation.
For a lender, there is no way to project this, and the "dotcoms"' crash and
burn scenario certainly does not inspire enthusiasm.

B. Cable

36 Data based on confidential interviews with industry experts.
37 Ben Chamey, Bell South Hangs Up DSL Phone Service, News.corn,
January 31, 2003 at http://news.com.com.

COMMUNICATIONS,
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The outlook for the cable industry is only slightly different. The cost of
capital for cable would be somewhat higher, simply because the cable industry
has only a 20-year run of substantial profitability, while the LECs have 120 years.
Moreover, cable faces more intense competition for its core video business
terrestrial satellites, from broadcasting and naturally from the LECs as well.
38
Cable systems generally pay about ten percent for long-term debt.
Because of the same risk factors facing the LECs, cable operators are likely to
39
pay rates in the fourteen to fifteen percent area.

At the same time, some cable companies may have significantly lower
capital and operating costs than LECs, as noted above. For example, Comcast
reports that virtually all of its current subscribers need only a relatively minor
electronic upgrade for cable modem service.4 0 Comcast also reports that it has
approximately ten percent cable modem penetration. 41 This higher than the LECs
have been able to achieve with DSL. It is not clear, however, to what extent these
systems are two-way, and how much work is necessary to make them fully
interactive. Again, implementation of nodal switching is the other big capital
item for cable systems.
As noted above, operating expenses for cable systems may be lower than
those for LECs. The variations in sophistication among systems, however, make
predictions difficult.

38

Data based on confidential interviews with industry experts.

39 Data based on confidential interviews with industry experts.
4 0How Do I

UpgradeMy Cable Services from Analog to Digital?at

https://www.comcast.con/support/corp 1/ FAQ/FaqDetail-209.html.
41 Comcast Reports Growth in Revenue, Cash Flow, Cable Modems and DigitalServices at

http://www.convergedigest.com/mergers/fmancialarticle.asp?ID=5393 (last visited Oct. 28,
2002).
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VI. OTHER BROADBAND CONFIGURATIONS
The information superhighway is probably not economically viable in
today's marketplace, but other broadband approaches may make more sense.
Broadband makes the most sense in urban central business districts.
For example, an investment of $2.5 billion to serve the lower half of
Manhattan would require annual revenues of about $1.25 billion to service and
debt and return net income of more than twenty percent. This amount translates
into 1,250,000 business lines at $1,000 annually for broadband service; and large
financial corporations obviously would need many more than just one line to
service their broadband needs. This would benefit only business users, and big
corporate users would gain the most. It would do nothing for "information-poor,"
who were the original intended beneficiaries of the electronic highway.
Moreover, all four RBOCs are experiencing declines in their total number of
42
subscriber lines.

CONCLUSION
The original vision of the information superhighway thus seems to have
disappeared. Instead, we are left with the traditional Internet. It is not a bad
communications device, but it is certainly not a means of bringing individuals
and educational institutions to a new intellectual level.
Could the government have acted to insure implementation of the
superhighway? To the extent that the problem is lack of interest from the private
sector to take a chance on a potentially low-return technology, government
funding-directly, through loan guarantees, tax incentives and so forth-might have

Vince Vittore & Flenn Bischoff, Access Line Count Evaporation, Telephony, at
http://telephonyonline.com/ar/ telecom access line count/index.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2002).
42
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made a difference.43 To the extent that few potential consumers or users have
any genuine interest in the program, additional funds - from any source - likely
would have made little or no difference.
Thus, this discussion ends where it began: with a question as to the
honesty of the United States government in its promotion of a program with
potentially great importance to its citizens.
Perhaps the NIL was over-engineered and under-designed for general
public use. The government's off-loading of its burdens onto the private sector,
however, did not promote any clarification as to the relevant applications,
constituency, or funding. In effect, the government merely walked away from the
whole issue.

4' For example, the former FCC Chair under the Clinton Administration, Reed Hundt, recently

advocated a new federal initiative to build the NII. John Eggerton, Washington Watch,
and
Cable,
available
at
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/
Broadcasting
index.asp?layout=print page&articlelD=CA250467 (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).

